Leaked emails about Solyndra are first to make sense

  •   Significantly lower installation costs were thought to be the key in countering the higher CIGS manufacturing costs of the tubular technolog
    Significantly lower installation costs were thought to be the key in countering the higher CIGS manufacturing costs of the tubular technology. Lower than expected operating performance was another nail in the technology's coffin.
  •   Sample email from the the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce enquiry into Solyndra
    Sample email from the the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce enquiry into Solyndra

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Mark Osborne
Mark Osborne
Mark Osborne is currently the Senior News Editor for Photovoltaics International and PV-Tech website. He has launched multiple technology titles in print and online covering manufacturing in the automotive, shipping, semiconductor and solar sectors in a publishing career spanning three decades. Mark started blogging in 2005, the first technology editor to do so and has worked online since 1996. A veteran manufacturing technology journalist and editor, Mark has been responsible for a series of innovative formats for delivering technical content to an engineering-based audience.

Updated. Having switched off from much, if not all, of the political aspects to the demise of Solyndra, at last we are getting some solid confirmation of the real problems Solyndra was dealing with and getting more inline with the real issue, which was technology based.

Reuters covers leaked emails from one of the key private investors, Kaiser's Argonaut Private Equity. A picture was painted of growing customer criticism of the unique cylindrical CIGS modules' actual power output compared to claimed specifications.

Customers were complaining but Solyndra’s CEO Chris Gronet wasn’t listening, according to the Reuters information gathered from emails.

I've forgotten how many times I asked Solyndra staff just what their conversion efficiencies were, without getting a reply. But the lack of response was always accompanied by a smile.

We had long known that its manufacturing costs were much higher than other thin-film offerings and that they were not cost-competitive with crystalline technologies – another aspect covered in emails, according to Reuters.

Yet being a differentiated product obviously wasn’t going to save the company without competitive pricing, which never happened. This wasn't just because the CEO wouldn’t allow this – Solyndra only lately focused on manufacturing cost reduction strategies.

Claims that ‘cheaper’ Chinese modules were the villains in the sorry saga continue to miss the point that Solyndra was responsible for its own demise. Granted, it didn’t help that crystalline module prices were falling and – since Solyndra’s collapse – have fallen even further and at a faster rate, but you can’t run a business that ships several hundred or several thousands of dollar notes per module order for long. The product can't cost more than you can sell it at.

This has now affected all tier-1 crystalline module manufacturers as prices have collapsed – something everyone is well aware of and one of the reasons why fears of bankruptcies have started circulating.

Update
 
Documents from the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce relating to this story are available here in Document 25
 
One email also highlights that the rush to use Fab1 to produce modules for market meant that no R&D on the CIGS processes had been undertaken for a year. This highlights that the lower-than-specified performance wouldn’t have been corrected quickly had it been tackled. Solyndra had reduced performance ratings by 3.5% and the same level reduction in pricing following complaints. 
 
CEO Gronet was also criticised for virtually abandoning its customer base in the commercial flat rooftop space for any business that would pay the highest prices.
 
This suggestion signals that the company's core product differentiation was undermined from inside the company at the highest level. 

Latest Comments

  • Sunbeam05 December 2011

    Finally!  Almost everybody in the valley who works in solar knew that Solyndra was never going to be competitive with their expensive design.  Cool idea, but not competitive.  They were doomed three years ago.  Too bad the govenrment didn’t ask a few solar experts in silicon valley about Solyndra’s competitive position.  The damage done by Solyndra has hurt all of us and the industry.  Another CEO with a big ego damages an industry.

  • ablazev05 December 2011

    There is only one person to blame for the $535 million loss from the failed Solyndra operations—Dr. Chu, DOE boss and chief scientist for he personally authorized the loan. He should’ve seen the clumsiness and exuberant cost of the cylindrical technology. And who in their right mind would give so much money for new buildings and equipment for mass production of a product that had not been properly tested and proven viable? And Dr. Chu did, and still arrogantly defends his decision, blaming the Chinese for the Solyndra demise.

    Now Dr. Chu is promoting another equally inefficient and unproven technology, but this one with a twist—it contains deadly cadmium compounds. Thousands of acres US deserts will be covered with these poisonous products and Dr. Chu will find another excuse for his bad decision to contaminate the environment and for billions of tax payers dollars wasted. But this time he can’t blame the Chinese.

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