
The US solar policy landscape has ebbed and flowed in the last month. After back-to-back shocks and changes over recent months, from the Safe Harbour deadline in early July and the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) inverter ban later that month, to the Section 232 tariffs in early August, things quietened down from August to mid-September.
Or they had done until this week, when the Department of Commerce (DOC) clarified anti-stockpiling rules preventing a rush of polysilicon imports before Section 232 comes into force. We published some snap industry analysis and reaction to that news yesterday, which you can find here. And my first US Policy Focus piece looked at the impacts that Section 232 may have for upstream US solar manufacturing.
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The second Policy Focus piece will look at the impact of a number changes that have happened over the last month or so: the executive order banning certain power equipment, the latest anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) determinations for Indian solar products, the impact that Trump’s policies have had on US clean energy jobs and the reinstatement of a low-income solar grant.
Executive order bans certain power equipment
On 26 August, president Donald Trump issued an emergency executive order banning the import of certain power equipment for grid-connected energy projects. It included grid-connected inverters, transformers and battery energy storage systems (BESS), alongside other equipment, and covered 24 countries on US embargo and sanctions lists. Obviously, for that equipment, China is the most pertinent country on the list.
The ultimate effects of the executive order are still unclear; the Department of Energy (DOE) has 120 days to issue rules on how to implement the order, though it seems that its framework will be similar to the Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions introduced last year, in focusing on the country of origin for specific components and materials. It will only affect transmission-grid scale products, leaving out smaller distributed energy sites.
The executive order said that certain products from certain countries pose an “unacceptable risk” to US grid security, largely on the grounds of cybersecurity risk, and declared a “national emergency”.
Legal experts from Norton Rose Fulbright have said the DOE may introduce “white lists” of permitted products, or develop a permitting system for developers wishing to use sensitive kit. More stringent measures could see existing equipment already in the US modified, monitored or removed.
Even more confusingly, this is a separate measure from the FCC’s designation that all foreign-made power inverters pose an “unacceptable risk to national security”. Speakers at the 2026 US Battery Asset Management Summit in California this week said that the FCC ban, along with the broader equipment ban, posed a greater risk to US renewable energy deployment than the FEOC restrictions that made headlines last summer. You can read PV Tech’s analysis of the solar market’s response to the FCC inverter ban here.
What does seem clear is that these two bans—which will particularly hit imports of inverters, for which the US currently cannot meet demand through domestic production, and potentially energy storage components too—are part of the current administration’s suite of “security” measures that will ultimately harm renewable energy deployments.
When the Section 232 polysilicon tariffs were announced—in the name of national security—it quickly became clear that they would help a small number of US solar manufacturers that already have a foothold but make deployments more expensive and provide essentially no incentive for new upstream manufacturing plans.
So far, restrictive efforts like FEOC and safe harbour deadlines have caused a rush in project development, and 2026 has actually seen a 45% year-on-year increase in solar deployments. But based on comments at this week’s Batter Asset Management Summit in California, the inverter, transformer and BESS bans could be formulated in a way “to kill a lot” of the planned development.
India AD/CVD results
The DOC also reached final determinations in the AD/CVD investigation into solar cells imported from India, Indonesia and Laos. As with previous AD/CVD cases, rates varied between countries and manufacturers. The biggest market, India, had AD and CVD rates of 123.04% and 126.09%, respectively. Laos and Indonesia saw lower rates.
The new AD/CVD case may not have a huge impact on the US solar market, given the various other cases already in force and the other import barriers already making it expensive to bring things into the US.
PV Tech heard that cell facilities in Indonesia and Laos may be forced to close unless they can find alternative markets, as the US was the primary reason for companies to establish capacity in those countries. The same pattern happened with the previous AD/CVD investigation in Southeast Asia, which slapped duties on cells and modules from Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia.
When it comes to India, most cell producers will be prioritising the domestic market anyway, with Production Linked Incentive (PLI) and Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM) policies that already support Indian cell production.
Waaree has the biggest US solar manufacturing footprint of any Indian company, with plans to potentially expand cell capacity. The new AD/CVD may accelerate those plans. Other Indian producers in the US, like Inox, which bought Boviet Solar’s US module assembly assets, will see US costs rise if they rely on Indian cells.
But, more broadly, there are so many barriers to importing cells to the US already that this AD/CVD case may make a limited difference for the US manufacturing landscape. Section 232 will already make importing assembled modules to the US a non-starter, and given that the time it would take to build a new US cell facility from scratch today would roughly coincide with the end of the Section 45X manufacturing tax credit, anyone not already planning such a move is unlikely to commit as a result of this.
A coalition of manufacturers, including First Solar and Hanwha QCells, was behind these AD/CVD investigations; the tariffs show the impact that a small group of US solar manufacturers can have in pushing for measures to make life harder for their competitors, many of whom are themselves based in the US but still rely on imported cells from various global suppliers.
Trump policies cost almost 40,000 jobs in 2025
US business group E2 reported this week that US clean energy industries lost almost 40,000 jobs in 2025 as a result of the Trump administration’s policy reversals and its broad anti-renewables actions. The company noted that the losses are significant enough to be an active reversal of the positive trend seen in preceding years, not just slower growth.
The “One Big, Beautiful” budget reconciliation bill of 2025 led to project cancellations and the removal of tax credits for residential and utility-scale solar developments. Alongside tighter permitting rules and broadsides against electric vehicle adoption, the US’ clean energy economy has taken a significant step backwards as a result of the changes. E2 said earlier this year that the OBBBA had cost the US around US$100 billion in clean energy investments.
Solar For All cancellation ruled unlawful
In a more hopeful development for US energy consumers, a Rhode Island judge ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) decision to cancel the Biden Administration’s Solar For All programme was unlawful, and called for the programme to continue.
US District Judge Mary McElroy ruled that the US$7 billion scheme, which was introduced to give grants to low- and moderate-income households, should never have been cancelled and the money never “pocketed” by the EPA because Congress intended to continue issuing the money.
This is good news for low-income households, particularly at a time of rising energy bills and other pressures on the cost of living. It’s also another small example of legal pushback against some of the Trump administration’s more stringent and aggressive moves against renewable energy.
Earlier this year a DC court ruled that the changes to “safe harbour” regulations for solar tax credits were too stringent, and reinstated the rule that a project could secure tax credits by committing 5% of its value by the deadline. Both are small moves, but there are small victories to be found in them.
The US policy landscape will be discussed in more detail at the PV CellTech USA conference on 13-14 October 2026. Read the full agenda here and book tickets on the event website.